[PQC] POST_QUANTUM_READINESS :: ASSESSING
[PQC] CRYPTO_INVENTORY_STATUS :: IN_PROGRESS
[PQC] RSA_2048_EXPOSURE_COUNT :: 847_ASSETS
[PQC] ECDH_P256_USAGE :: 2304_INSTANCES
[PQC] HARVEST_NOW_RISK_LEVEL :: HIGH_GOVT_DATA
[PQC] KYBER_MIGRATION_TIMELINE :: 2026_TARGET
[PQC] DILITHIUM_SIG_PILOT :: ACTIVE
[PQC] TLS_PQC_HYBRID_TEST :: RUNNING
[PQC] NIST_FIPS_203_READINESS :: EVALUATING
[PQC] QUANTUM_RISK_REGISTER :: DRAFT
[PQC] CRYPTO_AGILITY_FRAMEWORK :: DESIGNING
[PQC] BOARD_QUANTUM_BRIEF_DATE :: 2025-Q2
[PQC] REGULATORY_TIMELINE_MAP :: ACTIVE
[PQC] FAIR_QUANTUM_RISK_QUANT :: IN_PROGRESS
[PQC] POST_QUANTUM_READINESS :: ASSESSING
[PQC] CRYPTO_INVENTORY_STATUS :: IN_PROGRESS
[PQC] RSA_2048_EXPOSURE_COUNT :: 847_ASSETS
[PQC] ECDH_P256_USAGE :: 2304_INSTANCES
[PQC] HARVEST_NOW_RISK_LEVEL :: HIGH_GOVT_DATA
[PQC] KYBER_MIGRATION_TIMELINE :: 2026_TARGET
[PQC] DILITHIUM_SIG_PILOT :: ACTIVE
[PQC] TLS_PQC_HYBRID_TEST :: RUNNING
[PQC] NIST_FIPS_203_READINESS :: EVALUATING
[PQC] QUANTUM_RISK_REGISTER :: DRAFT
[PQC] CRYPTO_AGILITY_FRAMEWORK :: DESIGNING
[PQC] BOARD_QUANTUM_BRIEF_DATE :: 2025-Q2
[PQC] REGULATORY_TIMELINE_MAP :: ACTIVE
[PQC] FAIR_QUANTUM_RISK_QUANT :: IN_PROGRESS
Emerging Tech Security · Domain 06 · Tier 3
Quantum Security
Post-quantum cryptography migration, harvest-now-decrypt-later risk assessment, and quantum-ready governance for organisations with long data confidentiality horizons.
The Case for Quantum Security
Adversaries are harvesting encrypted data today with the explicit intent to decrypt it when cryptographically relevant quantum computers become available — and the window to act is closing.
NSA and GCHQ projected timeline for cryptographically relevant quantum computers capable of breaking RSA-2048
[NSA CNSA 2.0 Suite / NCSC Quantum Security Guidance 2023]
NIST post-quantum cryptography standards finalised in August 2024 — migration now a regulatory expectation
[NIST PQC Standardisation Project 2024]
Typical enterprise cryptographic migration timeline — organisations must begin now to complete before quantum threat materialises
[ENISA Post-Quantum Cryptography Report 2023]
Structured PQC Migration vs. Wait-and-See
The harvest-now-decrypt-later threat is not theoretical — intelligence assessments from NSA, GCHQ, and ENISA consistently indicate that nation-state actors are actively collecting encrypted communications with the explicit intent to decrypt them retroactively once cryptographically relevant quantum computers are available. Organisations with long data confidentiality requirements — financial records, health data, government communications, intellectual property — are already exposed. The data being stolen today will be readable in a decade.
Vyomerc's quantum security programme begins with a cryptographic inventory — identifying every instance of RSA, ECDH, and DSA across your infrastructure, applications, and supply chain. Harvest-now-decrypt-later risk is quantified using the FAIR model against your specific data classification and retention profile. A prioritised PQC migration roadmap then maps NIST FIPS 203 (ML-KEM/Kyber), FIPS 204 (ML-DSA/Dilithium), and FIPS 205 (SLH-DSA/SPHINCS+) to your vulnerability surface, with a crypto-agility framework ensuring future algorithm transitions can be executed without the same migration effort.
Vyomerc Quantum Security
Wait-and-See Approach
Harvest risk
FAIR-quantified harvest-now-decrypt-later risk against your specific data classification profile
Risk assumed negligible until quantum computers are operational — ignoring active harvesting today
Migration readiness
Full cryptographic inventory and NIST FIPS 203/204/205 migration roadmap with phased delivery
No inventory; migration effort unknown; timeline unplannable
Crypto-agility
Crypto-agility framework design ensures future algorithm transitions require weeks, not years
Monolithic cryptographic implementations require full re-engineering for each algorithm change
Regulatory readiness
Migration roadmap aligned to NSA CNSA 2.0, NCSC, and ENISA regulatory guidance timelines
Regulatory requirements missed until enforcement creates urgent, costly remediation
Operational Workflow
How the Engagement Executes.
[PHASE_01]
Cryptographic Inventory
Complete discovery of all cryptographic assets across infrastructure, applications, and supply chain — identifying every instance of vulnerable algorithms (RSA, ECDH, DSA) with an exploitability timeline.
[PHASE_02]
Harvest Risk Quantification
FAIR-model quantification of harvest-now-decrypt-later risk against your data classification, retention profile, and confidentiality horizon — producing a financially grounded risk register for board consumption.
[PHASE_03]
PQC Migration Roadmap
Prioritised migration roadmap mapping NIST FIPS 203, 204, and 205 algorithm adoption to your specific cryptographic vulnerability surface, with phased delivery milestones and integration architecture.
[PHASE_04]
Crypto-Agility Framework
Design of a crypto-agility framework enabling rapid future algorithm transitions through abstracted cryptographic layers — ensuring your organisation never faces another decade-long migration effort.
[PHASE_01]
Cryptographic Inventory
Complete discovery of all cryptographic assets across infrastructure, applications, and supply chain — identifying every instance of vulnerable algorithms (RSA, ECDH, DSA) with an exploitability timeline.
[PHASE_02]
Harvest Risk Quantification
FAIR-model quantification of harvest-now-decrypt-later risk against your data classification, retention profile, and confidentiality horizon — producing a financially grounded risk register for board consumption.
[PHASE_03]
PQC Migration Roadmap
Prioritised migration roadmap mapping NIST FIPS 203, 204, and 205 algorithm adoption to your specific cryptographic vulnerability surface, with phased delivery milestones and integration architecture.
[PHASE_04]
Crypto-Agility Framework
Design of a crypto-agility framework enabling rapid future algorithm transitions through abstracted cryptographic layers — ensuring your organisation never faces another decade-long migration effort.
Capability Matrix
Technical Specification & Deliverables.
Cryptographic Inventory
Complete enterprise cryptographic inventory identifying every instance of quantum-vulnerable RSA, ECDH, and DSA algorithms across infrastructure, applications, APIs, and third-party integrations.
NIST PQC Migration
Structured migration roadmap to NIST FIPS 203 (ML-KEM), FIPS 204 (ML-DSA), and FIPS 205 (SLH-DSA) with phased delivery, hybrid deployment strategies, and performance impact assessment.
Crypto-Agility Design
Crypto-agility framework design abstracts cryptographic algorithm selection from application code, enabling future NIST algorithm updates to be deployed in weeks rather than years of re-engineering.
Quantum Security Engagement
Begin your PQC migration before regulators demand it.
We conduct a complimentary cryptographic exposure snapshot identifying your highest-priority quantum-vulnerable assets before scoping a full PQC migration programme.
[QUANTUM_RESTRICTED // CRYPTO_INVENTORY_PROTECTED // NIST_PQC_ALIGNED]